In this note I discuss temporality, space, and sociality as interpreted through a social-phenomenological lens. The purpose is to synthesize these dimensions toward the construction of a macro-phenomenological frame of social analysis. I draw primarily on Alfred Schutz, as well as Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and lesser known work by Ilja Srubar who has focused on bringing together phenomenological perspectives on time, space, and sociality toward the creation of an analytical framework. Let’s begin immediately with the preliminaries on the concepts of time, space, and sociality.
First, temporality, as described by Husserl and Schutz, is central to understanding social phenomena. It distinguishes between the intimate, subjective experience of time (durée) and the standardized, anonymized system of time (standard world time), which are intertwined and essential for social coordination and meaning-making.
Second, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of embodiment shows that social space is not just a physical environment but a dynamic, meaningfully structured field shaped by the interactions between the embodied self and the environment.
Third, sociality is not a distinct dimension of being, but an extension of the interplay between time, the body, and shared experiences. It is rooted in the past, influences the present, and shapes the future, highlighting the dynamic and reciprocal nature of social interactions and the importance of intersubjectivity. Combined, I believe these lay a strong theoretical groundwork for a framework in macro-phenomenology, along the lines that sociologists such as John R. Hall and, more recently, Xiaohong Xu, and others, have called for.
The paper proceeds by developing each element using some illustrations. It concludes with a few thoughts on limitations of the approach. As the discussion is expository and developmental, I have avoided use of citations and standard academic apparati.
Temporality
Time, as the fundamental mode of phenomenal existence, plays a crucial role in shaping the relationship between individuals and the socially-instituted forms of temporal structure. This concept is central to the phenomenological psychology of lived experience, as outlined by Edmund Husserl. Husserl places time-consciousness at the heart of his descriptive phenomenology, emphasizing that our experience of the world is inherently temporal. This temporal nature of consciousness is not merely a passive reception of time but an active process of constituting and understanding time through what Husserl terms “retention” and “protention,” and “recollection” and “anticipation.”
Building upon Husserl’s insights, Alfred Schutz further develops the concept of temporality within the context of social phenomenology. Schutz integrates Husserl’s phenomenological perspective with Henri Bergson’s concept of the durée, or the lived, subjective experience of time. For Schutz, temporality is the foundational perspective from which social phenomena are understood. It is the vital dimension of the "we-relation," which is the core of intersubjectivity and social communication. This we-relation unfolds across two distinct registers. At the basic level, there is the phenomenal temporality of the lived experience of the Here-and-Now, which is the domain of the durée of embodied being. Here, experience is constituted, and meaning is created through the immediate, subjective experience of time.
Schutz's theory of the we-relation involves the synchronicity of two otherwise distinct durées of temporal experience. This encounter is not a one-sided experience from the perspective of Husserl's phenomenal Ego, nor is it a purely objectivated description of an external observer. Instead, it is a temporally founded understanding of the unfolding of a two-sided relationship—an interaction of bodies and their acts upon one another. This temporal encounter of the "we" is identified by Schutz as the domain proper of intersubjectivity and, consequently, the field proper of phenomenological social analysis. It serves as the only valid grounds for an interpretive science of social existence and its historicity, highlighting the dynamic and reciprocal nature of social interactions within a shared temporal framework.
In this framework, the inter-temporal synchronicity between individuals is what generates shared meaning and facilitates social communication. This is not just a matter of coordinating actions in time but involves a deep, phenomenological understanding of how each individual’s durée intersects and influences the other. Schutz’s emphasis on this temporal dimension underscores the importance of lived experience and the subjective, embodied nature of social interactions. By focusing on the temporal structure of social relationships, Schutz provides a rich and nuanced understanding of how individuals interact and create shared meanings within the social world.
Furthermore, this approach to social phenomenology challenges traditional views that might reduce social interactions to either purely individual experiences or external, objective observations. Instead, Schutz’s theory highlights the mutual and reciprocal nature of social encounters, where the temporal experience of one individual directly influences and is influenced by the temporal experience of another. This perspective is crucial for understanding the complex, dynamic nature of social existence and the ways in which individuals co-create their social reality through their shared temporal experiences. By grounding social analysis in the phenomenology of time-consciousness, Schutz offers a profound and insightful methodology for studying social phenomena that respects the intrinsic temporality and intersubjectivity of human experience. This is in striking contrast to Emilé Durkheim’s transcendetalization of the social as a realm of being that is external to individual consciousness and embodied being (elaboration on this topic will have to wait for a different ocassion).
The temporal structure of social life is a complex and multifaceted concept that transcends the individual’s subjective experience of time. Unlike the phenomenal temporality of the solitary Ego, which can be seen as amorphous and spontaneous, social life is characterized by structured and coordinated temporal modes that are shared among actors. This distinction is crucial because it highlights that social time is not merely an aggregation of individual temporal experiences but rather an emergent macro-structural framework that governs interactions and coordination within the social world.
The structure of social temporality can be analytically understood to lie along a continuum. At one end of this spectrum, we have the intimate and shared durée of the we-relation, as described by Schutz. This refers to the temporal experiences shared among close relationships such as those between parents and children, lovers, or close friends. Here, time is experienced in a more fluid and subjective manner, often characterized by a deep sense of mutual understanding and shared rhythms. However, this form of temporal coordination is limited to the micro-level of social interactions and does not extend to the broader social structure.
On the other end, we have what Schutz terms "standard world time," which can be described as "hegemonic" time. This is the anonymized and standardized system of temporal units and coordinates that are imposed on all social actors. Standard world time is the backbone of social coordination and action, providing a common framework for organizing daily activities, social rituals, and anonymous social encounters. It is this form of time that allows for the synchronization of individual actions and experiences, creating a shared temporal horizon that is essential for navigating the social world. This standard world time is not just a neutral backdrop but an active force that shapes the way individuals formulate their projects, compose their life plans, and integrate their personal biographies into the larger social narrative.
The interplay between these two forms of time—intimate we-time and standard world time—is vital for understanding how social life is structured. While the we-relation provides a sense of immediacy and shared experience, standard world time offers a broader framework for social organization and coordination. This dichotomy is not mutually exclusive; rather, they are intertwined. The individual’s phenomenal temporality must adapt to and align with the standard world time to function effectively within the social world. This alignment is necessary for participating in social rituals, adhering to social norms, and engaging in coordinated social actions.
Moreover, the concept of standard world time underscores the power dynamics inherent in social structures. As argued by scholars like C. Wright Mills, certain temporal imaginaries can produce exclusionary temporal ghettos, highlighting how time can be used to reinforce social inequalities and power imbalances. The imposition of standard world time can be seen as a form of social control, where certain groups may have more agency in defining the temporal norms and rhythms that govern social life, or impose certain temporal norms on others. This uneven distribution of temporal power (which is in turn the power over the distribution of standard world time) can significantly impact how individuals allocate their subjective time, make decisions, and navigate their daily lives.
In conclusion, the temporal structure of social life is a dynamic and complex system that integrates both micro-level intimate relationships and macro-level standardized temporal frameworks. Understanding this dual nature of time is essential for grasping how social coordination, social action, and individual life plans are shaped and executed within the social world. The interplay between these different forms of time highlights the intricate ways in which social life is organized and how time itself becomes a critical factor in the production and performance of social realities.
Space
Space, as conceptualized by Merleau-Ponty, is intricately tied to the notion of embodiment, where the immediate and extended environment is inhabited by an embodied self. This environment is not just a passive backdrop but an actively constituted and constantly changing field of linguistically objectivated and expressed elements. The space we inhabit is multifaceted, comprising both the physical realm of material things with their intrinsic horizons of positionalities and relations, and the social realm, which is inhabited by others and includes all aspects of the human world such as nature, products, and social interactions.
In this context, social space is not a homogeneous or fixed entity but a dynamic field structured by categorical "types" and "relevances" (Schutz). These types and relevances organize space into stratified zones distinguished by degrees of familiarity and unfamiliarity, zones within reach and zones outside of reach. For instance, the zones within reach are those that are intimately known and can be restored to familiarity through memory or action, while zones outside of reach are mediated symbolically and often remain anonymous. This distinction is not merely physical but social and symbolic, reflecting the different meanings and relevances that space acquires for actors situated within different social milieus. A restaurant diner, for example, may be physically close to the kitchen but lack intimate knowledge of its operations and understand its operators in entirely anonymous terms, highlighting how physical proximity does not necessarily equate to familiarity.
The structure of social space, as Merleau-Ponty would argue, is fundamentally linked to the embodied experience of the individual. The body’s intentional relationship with space is not just about physical movement but about a pre-cognitive, pre-reflective encounter with the world as meaningfully structured. This means that space is not a haphazard collection of objects but a field of meaningful relations that are shaped by the interactions between the embodied self and the environment. The relevances that structure social space are unevenly distributed across actors, making the same physical space acquire different meanings depending on the social position of the actor. For a company’s low-level staff member, the CEO’s office may be an alienating or forbidden space, while for the CEO, it is a space of power and control. This asymmetry of social space is what makes structuralist forms of social analysis particularly productive, as they can uncover the underlying structures and meanings that shape the experiences of different actors within the same physical environment. These analysis remain limited, however, when they disregard temporality. Temporality can work to both reduce and expand distances across social space.
Moreover, the notion of space as an objectivated environment shaped by linguistic, symbolic, and material relations underscores the temporal and causal nature of space. Space is not just a static backdrop but a dynamic field that unfolds temporally, with present actualities and horizons of possibility embedded within it. This temporal dimension of space highlights the importance of considering the causal conditions that shape our environment and how these conditions influence our embodied experience. In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, space is the moment of action in the Here-and-Now, where the embodied self engages with the world in a perpetual cycle of perception, action, and meaning-making.
The intercorporeality that Merleau-Ponty emphasizes further complicates the notion of social space by introducing the idea that our bodies are not isolated entities but are interconnected in a web of expressive and recursive relationships. This means that social space is not just a field of individual experiences but a shared space where gestures, eye contact, and other forms of non-verbal communication create a common ground for understanding and interaction. In this sense, social space is a communal space that is shaped by the collective embodied experiences of its inhabitants.
Sociality
Sociality, as an integral component of human experience, is deeply intertwined with both temporality and embodiment. It is not a standalone dimension that can be isolated from these other fundamental aspects of human existence. Instead, sociality emerges as an extension and a culmination of the complex interplay between time, the body, and the shared experiences of individuals.
As a temporal extension, sociality is rooted in the past, yet it dynamically influences the present and shapes the future. The objectivated set of discontinuous and discontinued relationships from past interactions extends into the present, forming the fabric of current social dynamics. This temporal dimension of sociality is evident in the way historical events, cultural traditions, and personal experiences collectively contribute to the social norms, values, and expectations that govern our interactions today. For instance, the way families function, the structure of workplaces, and the operations of educational institutions are all influenced by historical precedents and the accumulated knowledge of previous generations.
In its spatial extension, sociality manifests as the symbolic representation of otherness and the socially instituted divisions and distributions of knowledge. This includes the evolving networks of interrelationships that reflect the intensity of social relations and the changing communicative budget of a society. The communicative budget, as defined by Thomas Luckmann, refers to the distribution of the collective stock of knowledge and its corresponding structures of public validation and legitimation within institutions and among institutionally vested actors. These symbolic representations and divisions are not static; they are subject to constant negotiation and transformation as social actors interact and redefine their positions within the social landscape. For example, the way knowledge is disseminated through educational systems, the role of media in shaping public opinion, and the functioning of political institutions all reflect and influence the spatial dynamics of sociality.
The combined social semantics of temporality, embodiment, and intersubjectivity provide a robust framework for understanding the complex and dynamic nature of social reality. This macro-phenomenological matrix, enriched by the concepts of historicity and its “plastic dynamics” as outlined by Srubar, allows for a nuanced interpretation of how the social semantics of communicative budgets evolve and change over time. By examining the materialized coordinations of time, space, and sociality in concrete domains of action such as families, workplaces, schools, markets, parliaments, and state bureaucracies, researchers can track how these changes reflect in the everyday living framework. This approach not only highlights how social semantics and communicative budgets shape and reproduce social structures but also reveals how they can undermine or transform these structures. For instance, shifts in family structures, changes in workplace cultures, and reforms in educational policies all illustrate how social semantics can both reinforce and challenge existing social norms.
Moreover, the embodied nature of sociality cannot be overlooked. As phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty and Husserl have emphasized, our bodies are not mere biological entities but are fundamentally intertwined with our social and temporal experiences. The concept of intercorporeal being, or "flesh," as coined by Merleau-Ponty, underscores the reversible and interconnected nature of bodily experiences. This intercorporeality is crucial in understanding how social interactions are mediated through nonverbal cues such as gestures, facial expressions, posture, and bodily style. These embodied interactions form the pre-reflective dynamical background that underpins our social engagements, influencing how we perceive, engage with, and interact within our shared world.
In the context of technological mediation, the embodiment of sociality takes on new dimensions. Online communication platforms alter the structures of our social encounters, affecting the perceptual access, intercorporeality, shared space, and self-presentation that are integral to social interactions. While these alterations can be seen as diminishing or constraining embodiment in some respects, they also offer new and potentially more manageable forms of social engagement. This highlights the need for a platform-sensitive analysis of online sociality, recognizing that different technological environments may represent distinct “provinces of meaning” that facilitate different styles of sociality that may be more or less appropriate depending on the context and the individuals involved. By embracing this diversity, we can understand technological mediation as fabricated social spaces that reflect the varied needs and desires of different subjects and groups, rather than seeing them as perfect replicas of offline sociality.
Limitations of the macro-phenomenological framework
It is important to address two critical limitations related to the phenomenological approach in studying societal macro-structures as proposed here. First, there is the concern that this approach might overemphasize individual subjective experiences, or at least a view from the egological perspective, potentially overlooking the independent role of structural and systemic factors that significantly influence social interactions. This critique highlights the need for a perspective that begins to integrate subjective experience with insights into the larger social, cultural, and historical contexts in which these experiences are embedded. This calls for some form of critical synthesis between phenomenology and traditionally macro-level traditions of analysis such as historical sociology or institutionalist political economy. Indeed, the entire purpose of macro-phenomenology is to use the fundamental insights of phenomenological egology to undercover and reveal (rather than to mask and obscure) forces that in the social sciences are typically labeled “structural” or “systemic.”
Second, the intricate and nuanced nature of phenomenological concepts can pose challenges in their practical application, particularly in social analysis or policy-making where more concrete and measurable methods are often preferred. However, the macro-phenomenological framework is not by definition set against formal analytical concepts that lend themselves to formalized methodologies of observation and measurement. These analytical concepts (e.g., temporal power) must draw upon the basic theoretical framework. The fact of qualitative complexity, which the macro-phenomenological framework validates and preserves against any kind of reductionist approach to social reality, underscores the richness and depth that phenomenology brings to understanding human existence, encouraging an approach that values the lived experiences and relational dynamics that shape our interactions with the world.
Here marks both an ending and a beginning, carrying the hope that I can generate further formal and empirical advancements in this train of thought.